Andrzej Marszewski
Ukraine’s display at Kielce revealed an emerging family of indigenous strike and air-defence weapons – and a bid for greater control over the conduct of the war.
Some of the most consequential exhibits at MSPO 2026 were not produced by one of Europe’s prime established defence corporations. Ukraine used this opportunity to showcase its own family of domestically-produced missiles, to assert its independence in both missile production and in targeting decision-making.
The centrepiece of the Fire Point display was not just one “buzz” weapon but an introduction to an entire family of strike assets. Alongside its now headline-making FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile were mock-ups of the FP-7 and FP-9 – very much the shape of things to come. Together, they could indicate an intention to reach strategic sites deep inside Russia.
The FP-5 has so far proven itself to be the foundation for that ambition. Fire Point claims the ground-launched cruise missile can carry a warhead of approximately 1,150kg over a range of up to 3,000km. Unlike a ballistic missile, it uses an air-breathing jet engine: while of impressive size, the design philosophy emphasises range, payload and manufacturability rather than exquisite complexity. Ukraine has already used Flamingo against Russian targets, giving real-world credibility.
The smaller FP-7 was presented as a tactical ballistic missile, delivering a150kg warhead to around 200km, with a maximum velocity of 1,500m/s claimed. That places a wide range of operational targets, beyond the comfortable reach of many conventional systems, in its sights.
The FP-9 is altogether more ambitious. Fire Point claims a range of up to 855km, an 800kg payload and a speed of approximately 2,200m/s, which potentially threatens very high-value targets far inside. Furthermore, ballistic missiles descend at high speed, compressing the time available to detect, classify and intercept them. Even where Russian air defences remain capable, larger salvos could force them to expend scarce interceptors and divide attention between missiles and long-range drones.
At MSPO, Ukraine’s air-defence ambitions were on display. The Luch State Design Bureau showcased its latest Koral missile; 4.8m long, weighing about 450kg including a 36kg warhead, featuring inertial guidance, radio correction and an active radar seeker. If developed into an effective system, Koral could offer an indigenous component to an air-defence ecosystem still heavily dependent on Western missiles.
Fire Point is also pursuing its own separate interceptor programme, dubbed Freyja. Its FP-7.X missile completed a controlled manoeuvring flight test earlier this year and is intended to form the basis of a future anti-ballistic system. The company has also reached an understanding with Hensoldt over the use of the TRML-4D radar. This illustrates the scale of the challenge. An interceptor is only one part of air defence; radar, C2, targeting data and reliable seekers are at least as important.
All these specifications require caution. The figures are principally manufacturers’ claims, while the FP-7 and FP-9 displayed at MSPO were mock-ups rather than operational missiles. Range and warhead weight say little about accuracy under electronic attack, reliability, launch preparation or the number that can actually be manufactured. Whilst Ukraine’s has proven genuine innovation, operational reality does not abolish engineering risk.
The overall strategic direction is unmistakable. Homemade means greater independence since domestically-produced missiles are less vulnerable to foreign stockpile shortages, export controls and disputes over whether Western-supplied weapons may strike targets inside Russia. They can also be modified rapidly in response to battlefield experience, this being a hallmark of Ukraine’s wartime rapid rise in defence production. Western support remains indispensable, especially in sensors, seekers, radar and finance, but cooperation becomes more equal when Ukraine contributes the weapon rather than merely receives it. That distinction matters greatly in a war thus far constrained by allied caution.
MSPO showed a defence industry attempting to turn wartime improvisation into lasting sovereign capability. Not every missile displayed at Kielce will necessarily fulfil its advertised promise. But if even part of this family reaches reliable mass production, Ukraine will have gained something beyond additional firepower: greater control over how, where and for how long it can continue the war and, perhaps most crucially of all, on its own terms, not Russia’s or anyone else’s.
Andrzej Marszewski is Defence Alternatives’ Correspondent-at-Large
Headline image Fire Point’s FP-9 ballistic-missile, (left) and FP-7 mock-ups at MSPO 2026 in Kielce. (Andrzej Marszewski)
