by Philip Hicks
In the first article in this series, I argued that Britain’s defence debate is increasingly characterised by a tension between ambition and affordability. The second examined the distinction between capability and capacity, suggesting that military power ultimately depends upon the industrial foundations capable of sustaining it.
This raises a further question.
If Britain wishes to strengthen its armed forces, rebuild industrial resilience and assume a greater role in an increasingly uncertain world, what model should it follow?
Different nations answer that question in different ways. The United States relies primarily upon scale. France places greater emphasis on sovereignty. Britain has traditionally occupied a position somewhere between the two. None of these approaches can simply be copied. Each reflects different histories, strategic cultures, economic realities and perceptions of risk.
The challenge for Britain is not choosing between them wholesale. It is understanding what lessons each model offers and determining which elements are relevant to its own circumstances.
More fundamentally, Britain must establish whether its own approach constitutes a coherent strategy or merely a collection of historical compromises, alliances and industrial constraints.
The American Model: Scale as Strategy
The United States approaches defence from a position few nations can realistically emulate.
Its military strength rests not only on the world’s largest defence budget but on an industrial ecosystem of extraordinary scale. Increasingly, American policymakers treat the defence industrial base as a strategic asset. Manufacturing resilience, workforce development, supply-chain security and production capacity now feature prominently in American defence thinking. The publication of the first National Defense Industrial Strategy reflected growing concern that industrial strength could no longer be treated as a secondary consideration.
Underlying this approach is a simple assumption: scale creates strategic freedom.
A country capable of producing at scale can absorb losses, sustain multiple military commitments, expand manufacturing during crises and invest simultaneously in both existing and emerging capabilities.
The advantages are obvious. Scale creates resilience, flexibility and deterrence.
Yet scale should not be confused with efficiency. The American defence industrial base possesses enormous financial and technological resources, but it is not immune to supply-chain vulnerabilities, workforce shortages, production bottlenecks or the challenges associated with rapidly expanding output. Recent American industrial initiatives have focused precisely on addressing these weaknesses through investment in workforce development, supply-chain resilience and domestic production capacity.
Nor is the United States entirely self-contained. Modern American defence production depends upon industrial relationships with allies and partners, demonstrating that even the largest defence ecosystem benefits from international cooperation.
The lesson for Britain is therefore not that it should attempt to replicate American scale. It cannot. The more relevant lesson is that industrial capacity is increasingly regarded as a strategic capability.
The French Model: Sovereignty as Strategy
France approaches defence power from a different perspective.
Where the American model relies upon scale, the French model places greater emphasis on sovereignty.
Successive French governments have sought to retain national control over critical defence capabilities, even when doing so involves significant cost. This philosophy is visible across France’s independent nuclear deterrent, combat aircraft industry, naval construction programmes, space capabilities and broader defence-industrial base.
At the heart of this approach lies a particular understanding of strategic autonomy.
Dependence on others is viewed as a potential vulnerability. Sovereign capability is therefore regarded not simply as an economic objective but as a strategic necessity.
Yet French strategic autonomy should not be confused with isolation. France remains deeply integrated within NATO, participates in multinational programmes and maintains extensive defence partnerships. The objective is not independence in every area, but control over those capabilities considered essential to freedom of action.
This distinction is important.
Sovereignty is not an absolute condition. It is a series of deliberate choices, each carrying financial, industrial and strategic consequences.
The benefits are considerable. Sovereign capability provides freedom of action, supports critical skills and preserves national control.
The costs are equally real. Sovereignty must be financed. It requires sustained domestic demand, specialist expertise, long-term research investment and export success sufficient to maintain industrial viability.
France accepts these trade-offs because they align with its understanding of national power.
The British question is whether similar choices should be applied more selectively.
The British Model: Selective Sovereignty
Britain is often portrayed as occupying a position somewhere between the American and French approaches. The reality is somewhat more complicated and nuanced.
The United Kingdom remains one of only a handful of countries capable of designing and building nuclear-powered submarines. It possesses advanced aerospace capabilities, globally competitive defence companies, sophisticated defence technologies and an established export sector. At the same time, British defence policy has long depended upon alliances, multinational programmes and international supply chains.
The result is often described as selective sovereignty. The concept sounds straightforward enough. Britain maintains sovereign control in selected areas while relying upon collaboration and partnership elsewhere.
The more difficult question is whether this represents a coherent national strategy or a description of existing constraints.
There is an important difference between deliberately choosing where sovereignty matters most and accepting dependencies because maintaining complete sovereignty has become unaffordable.
If selective sovereignty is to become more than a convenient label, it requires a clear understanding of which capabilities are indispensable and why.
Recent debates surrounding the implementation of the Strategic Defence Review and the delayed publication of the Defence Investment Plan illustrate the challenge. Identifying strategic priorities is one thing. Sustaining the investment, industrial capacity and political commitment required to support them over decades is something rather different. The delay to the Defence Investment Plan attracted criticism from parliamentary committees, industry and defence commentators who argued that uncertainty over priorities risked undermining confidence in both the armed forces and the defence industrial base.
The publication of the UK’s new Offset Policy alongside the Defence Investment Plan is also revealing. Historically, procurement and industrial policy have often been treated as separate activities. The offset framework implicitly challenges that assumption by recognising that major defence purchases can also be used to strengthen domestic supply chains, develop skills, attract investment and support strategically important sectors. The significance lies less in the policy itself than in what it implies: an increasing recognition that sovereignty and industrial capacity cannot be separated from procurement decisions. Increasingly, the debate is not simply about what Britain buys, but about what Britain retains the capacity to design, manufacture and sustain. That is ultimately a sovereignty question as much as an industrial one.
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that government has failed to commit additional resources. The Defence Investment Plan is backed by £298 billion of investment over the next four years, while defence spending is set to increase substantially. Yet the criticism levelled at the delayed Defence Investment Plan was not primarily about the absence of money. It was that strategy, investment and implementation appeared to be moving at different speeds. The Strategic Defence Review set out ambitious objectives. The Budget provided additional resources. The more difficult task has been translating both into a sequenced and prioritised plan. In that sense, the challenge is not merely financial. It is whether difficult capability decisions are genuinely being made or simply deferred into future spending cycles.
Selective sovereignty is therefore only meaningful if governments are willing to make the difficult choices required to sustain it. Otherwise, it risks becoming less a doctrine than a description of deferred decisions.
Britain’s nuclear deterrent illustrates the complexity of modern sovereignty. The United Kingdom retains sovereign political control over its deterrent and maintains domestic expertise in areas such as warhead design and stewardship. Yet the Trident missile system itself relies upon a long-standing arrangement with the United States and a broader framework of nuclear cooperation.
This does not negate Britain’s nuclear independence. It does, however, demonstrate that sovereignty rarely exists in a pure form.
The more useful question is not whether dependencies exist. It is whether they create unacceptable constraints on freedom of action.
That question extends far beyond nuclear weapons. Modern military systems increasingly depend upon software, semiconductors, sensors, communications networks, specialist materials and rapidly evolving digital technologies. A nation may assemble and operate a platform domestically while remaining dependent upon external technologies that influence its performance, maintainability or future development.
Operational sovereignty and industrial sovereignty are not always the same thing.
The challenge facing Britain is therefore not simply deciding what it wishes to build. It is deciding what it must control.
Three Approaches to Defence Power
| Model | Core Principle | Strategic Advantage | Principal Limitation | Strategic Question |
| United States | Scale | Industrial depth, resilience and surge capacity | Cost, complexity and production bottlenecks | How much capability can scale generate? |
| France | Sovereignty | Freedom of action and national control | Cost of sustaining independent capabilities | Which capabilities must remain under national control? |
| United Kingdom | Selective Sovereignty | Balances national capability with allied integration | Dependence upon difficult strategic choices | Which dependencies are acceptable, and which are strategic vulnerabilities? |
The table inevitably simplifies more complex realities, yet it highlights the central dilemma confronting Britain.
The country lacks the industrial scale of the United States.
It is unlikely to pursue sovereignty with the same intensity as France.
The question is whether it can transform selective sovereignty from a description of current circumstances into a deliberate and sustainable strategy.
The Choice Ahead
The debate about rearmament often focuses on budgets, procurement programmes and equipment numbers. These issues matter, but they are ultimately secondary to a more fundamental question:
What kind of defence power does Britain want to become?
Attempting to replicate American industrial scale would quickly encounter Britain’s financial constraints. Seeking French levels of sovereign capability across every sector would present similar difficulties.
Neither approach offers a realistic blueprint.
Selective sovereignty therefore appears a more credible path. But it should not become a justification for accepting existing dependencies by default, or for treating industrial limitations as permanent features of national defence.
The challenge is to identify those capabilities essential to national security and freedom of action, preserve the industrial and technological foundations required to sustain them, and develop partnerships that provide access to wider resources without creating unacceptable vulnerabilities.
Yet even if Britain can determine what capabilities it must control, what capacity it must retain and which dependencies it can accept, further questions remain. Can those capabilities support the global role Britain continues to claim for itself? And can the institutions responsible for defence acquire, innovate and deliver at the pace events increasingly demand?
The remaining question is whether Britain possesses the strategic clarity and political commitment to make its choices count.
Rearmament is not simply a matter of spending more or building more.
It is about deciding what the country must be able to control, what it can safely share, and what it can realistically sustain.
Image – The Vanguard Class: sustaining the deterrent on borrowed time. Commissioned in the 1990s with a 25-year operational lifespan, the Royal Navy’s four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines are now entering their fourth decade of service. As the transition to the next-generation Dreadnought class looms in the early 2030s, the aging fleet faces severe availability strains and extended deployments to maintain the UK’s uninterrupted maritime shield. (RN/CPOA(Phot) Tam McDonald)
