The US Space Development Agency (SDA), established in 2019, was a valiant attempt to short circuit the acquisition and procurement bottleneck challenges that had plagued the DoW’s attempts to field effective space capability to that point. Now, a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that one of the agency’s key programmes is in at least medium temperature water – though the report does make recommendations to fix it, with the Department of the Air Force accepting five and partially accepting the sixth.
The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) is a new name for the National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA). Regardless of the name change, the aim remains the same: to provide combatant commands with a constellation of space- and ground-based assets to facilitate a wide variety of missions, among the most important of which is missile warning and tracking. This will be achieved partially through the deployment of 300-500 satellites in low earth orbit (LEO – up to 2,000km). The programme is envisioned to cost up to US$35 billion through FY 2029, with contract award every two years and the individual satellites requiring replacement every five years.
Deployment of the ‘Transport Layer’ satellites under Tranche 1 is already under way, with the average cost per satellite currently standing at $14.1 million against the original SDA estimate of $15-25 million. Future launches are currently predicted to come in at a unit cost of under $14 million. These satellites will provide the LEO mesh network that will enable mission critical communication and effectiveness.
GAO’s criticisms centre on process rather than technology or CONOPS. Perhaps the largest error contributing to mission risk is the assertion that the agency has consistently overestimated the technology readiness levels of the component parts of the solution. This has led to significantly more work (and cost) than originally scheduled – the spacecraft require unforeseen modification, for example – which has already significantly impacted scheduled delivery of capability to the combatant commands. The GAO also points to a relatively opaque requirements process, in which the combatant commands have been only marginally included in the process: this risks delivery of capability the warfighter neither needs nor desires.
The fact that no architecture-level schedule has yet been developed is perhaps forgivable – though somewhat surprisingly complacent – given that the agency has been juggling multi-level and often conflicting scheduling priorities for the duration of the programme to date. The most damning accusation, however, in the light of continually ignoring like issues for decades, is the fact that life-cycle costs for the programme are neither known nor monitored. Paying attention to the unit cost of the first generation of satellites is laudable; ignoring the potential impact of lacking control over the acquisition, fielding and sustainability costs appears to be sheer willfulness.
DA Comment
Forty years of observing the defence acquisition process leads to a degree of cynicism. It is certainly true that procurement reform and smart acquisition have made massive leaps forward over the years: but all the goodwill that generates can be reduced to a zero impact on credibility when accompanied by major programme complacency as appears to be the case here. The Air Force may have accepted five of the GAO’s six recommendations – and possibly the SDA has as well. But we need to focus on how to avoid such damning reports being necessary in the first place.
Readers interested in accessing summary or full versions of the GAO report may click here.
Headline image: A generic ground control station image, courtesy SDA.
